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This project investigates the ways in which refuge and asylum seeker populations in France have 
been affected by the COVID-19 virus.  I argue that refugees and asylum seekers in France are an 
already vulnerable population and this vulnerability was exacerbated during and as a result of 
COVID-19.  My research stems from an array of scholarly articles, popular press, organization 
websites, and interviews I conducted with individuals in France who work with refugees and 
asylum seekers.  I used my literature review, which looks at France’s history with national 
identity, xenophobia, and racism, as a framework in analyzing my data.  My findings present the 
themes of restrictive mobility, accommodation, and fear and mistrust that refugees and asylum 
seekers have experienced during COVID-19.  These findings support my argument that the 
vulnerability of refugees and asylum seekers in France is reinforced through systems of national 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 
 
On the morning of March 12th, 2020, I was getting ready to head to the airport from my 
temporary home in France to Edinburgh for a weekend trip.  COVID-19 had already entered 
Italy and was spreading to other countries, but the severity of the virus at that point was very 
much underplayed by both myself and other individuals across the globe.  My program director 
and I both came to the agreement that because this was only a weekend trip and no COVID-19 
cases had yet been reported in the UK, I would be safe to travel and re-enter France.  The next 
morning, the day I was supposed to fly to Edinburgh, the severity of COVID-19, at least in terms 
of travel restrictions and border closers, soon became a reality when I received a text message 
from my program director saying that all study abroad programs were cancelled.  I am aware that 
there is a large amount of privilege in me not only being able to study abroad in France, 
especially for nearly an entire academic year and also have the means and ability to travel on the 
weekends.  Nevertheless, I was devastated by the cancellation of our program.  At that point, the 
uncertainty surrounding COVID-19 and fast-approaching travel restrictions prompted my parents 
and I to book me the next available flight back to the U.S.  I was fortunate enough to have a safe 
home and family to go back to, but I thought about those in much worse and vulnerable positions 
due to COVID-19 shutdowns, especially refugees and asylum seekers.  This past summer, I 
receive a funded research fellowship and had the opportunity to work with my advisor, Dr. Pablo 
Bose, in researching the impacts of the eurozone crisis, 2015 migration influx, and COVID-19 
virus on refugees and asylum seekers in Europe.  Combined with my interests and experience 
abroad, I decided to pursue a project looking at the ways in which refugees and asylum seekers 
have been impacted by COVID-19 and focus on the case of France.  
 6 
My main research question asks how COVID-19 has affected asylum seeker and refugee 
populations in France.  My thesis project adds to the current and emerging research concerning 
asylum seeker and refugee populations in the age of COVID-19 in France.  I focus on the four 
different topics of borders, public health, enforcement, and stigmatization/discrimination in an 
effort to answer this question.  I argue that due to COVID-19 these four aspects have 
significantly constrained the lives of asylum seeker and refugee populations in France, an already 
vulnerable population, and has exasperated the vulnerability of these populations.  In exploring 
these research questions, I look at refugee resettlement in the past decade in Europe and France 
more specifically, especially in regard to refugee integration, rural resettlement, and resettlement 
during COVID-19.  Additionally, I discuss Europe and France’s histories with national identity 
and its ties to xenophobia and racism.  I also investigate previous global pandemics, measures 
imposed, and how these measures affected refugee and asylum seeker populations, before 
focusing in on the case of COVID-19.  This background research provides the necessary context 
to explore the specific effects on refugees and asylum seekers in France during COVID-19.  
Using my findings and analysis, I conclude that given the circumstances of COVID-19, refugee 
and asylum seeker populations in France are increasingly vulnerable, both because of the 
country’s history with strong narratives surrounding national identity, xenophobia, and racism, in 
addition to current realities and challenges these populations are facing like restrictive mobility, 
accommodation, and fear/mistrust.    
The bulk of my research focused on textual and qualitative analyses.  I also conducted 
four semi-structured interviews, although not as many as I had originally hoped.  However, the 
plethora of literature concerning refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, and France specifically, 
in addition to emerging data and information regarding COVID-19, ended up being more than 
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sufficient for this project and the interviews only strengthened my research.  I interviewed 
volunteers and employees of NGOs and aid groups in France who work with asylum seekers and 
refugees.  Interviews are important when conducting research because they can provide greater 
nuance and insight than from statistical data or observations alone and can provide diverse 
perspectives about a topic.  Due to the emerging and changing information circulating around 
COVID-19, I believed it was important to reach out to specific NGOs and organizations in 
France in order to understand and provide the latest and most accurate information concerning 
the situation for refugees and asylum seekers.  I was able to pursue these interview contacts with 
the help of Dr. Bose and his connections from projects he has conducted in the past.  I utilized a 
semi-structured format with a set of ten preliminary questions to structure my interviews (Dunn, 
2016).  I developed and pre-tested my questions to ensure that they were comprehensible and 
approved them with my advisor.  I complied with all Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
requirements and procedures and I have completed the CITI Program Course “IRB - Human 
Subjects Research Social-Behavioral-Educational Researchers Basic Course”.  My certification 
is valid until June 1, 2023.  After my interviews, I used Microsoft Word’s “Dictate” feature to 
transcribe the two interviews I conducted in English.  My two other interviews were in an email 
format because of convenience and language barriers.  For one of the email interviews, I 
translated my original interview questions to French and emailed them to the interviewee.  They 
then answered the questions in French, emailed them back to me, and then I translated their 
answers in English to the best of my ability.  The other email interview questions and responses 
were sent and received in English.  After transcribing the interviews, I coded the responses by 
theme to use for my findings and data analysis chapters.   
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In addition to conducting interviews, I drew from and added to a rich database of both 
comparative and France focused information regarding migrant influxes and refugee resettlement 
that I created this past summer, in collaboration with Dr. Bose, through my summer research 
fellowship.  The majority of this data focuses on refugee resettlement in France in 2010 and 2015 
to which I added 2020 data when available.  Refugee resettlement data is provided by the 
UNHCR Resettlement Database and includes the number of resettled refugees in France by year 
in addition to the top countries of origin of those resettled refugees.  I then use my findings, from 
both the interviews and database, to answer my research question as to how COVID-19 and its 
subsequent effects on borders, public health, enforcement, and stigmatization/discrimination 
have impacted asylum seeker and refugee populations.  
I confronted several challenges when researching for this project.  One difficulty was 
navigating data, both because of availability and because of the occasional language barrier.  
Luckily, the individuals I interviewed were extremely helpful and provided me with websites and 
documents with the information I was looking for.  However, much of the data that would have 
been helpful is not yet available because COVID-19 is still very present and much of the data 
from 2020 has not yet been published in France.  Also, France does not collect data on race, 
ethnicity, religion, nor migrant data (Collyer, 2014; Deutsche Welle, 2020a).  
While it was easier to conduct interviews over a video platform rather than in person, it 
was still challenging to organize these interviews because these organizations are extremely busy 
at the moment and are often unable to take the time to be interviewed.  I received several 
responses from organizations who were very interested in my project but apologized for their 
unavailability.  Although, the majority of my data was from textual and qualitative analyses, so a 
large number of interviews was not necessary for this specific project.  Another challenge was 
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the language barrier as all of the individuals I interviewed were fluent French speakers.  
Although I am proficient in French, I did not feel comfortable conducting interviews in French 
over video.  Two interviewees were nearly fluent in English, so I was able to successfully 
interview them over video.  Another interview was conducted over email and I translated the 
responses into English.  However, translations are not perfect and certain phrases or words do 
not directly translate from French to English and vice versa.  Furthermore, information would 
have been more comprehensive if I was conducting interviews between two native English 
speakers, but that was not possible for this project.     
It was also challenging to conduct my research and write this thesis report during a global 
pandemic as news is constantly changing and evolving and information is often unpredictable 
and unknown.  This required me to be flexible and strategic in my research and writing.  
I begin this thesis by explaining the methods used to conduct this project. I decided to use 
a mixed methods approach in an attempt to answer my research questions because I argue that in 
order to understand how COVID-19 affected refugee and asylum seeker populations in France, it 
is necessary to put this situation in historical context in addition to providing current research 
and data to make a cohesive and comprehensive argument.  This structure is evident in the first 
chapter of my literature review, where I examine refugee resettlement in Europe and France 
specifically as well as European and French national identity.  In addition, the second chapter of 
my literature review discusses past literature regarding infectious diseases and global pandemics 
but also recent literature and popular press articles investigating the effects of COVID-19 on 
refugee and asylum seeker populations generally, and then focusing on the specific case of 
France.  In my findings section, I investigate the effects of COVID-19 on refugee and asylum 
seeker populations in France specifically.  I also interviewed several individuals from various 
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NGOs and organizations who work with refugees and asylum seekers in France and their 
experience during COVID-19, which provided a different perspective and strengthened my 
mixed methods approach in answering my research questions.  Finally, I analyze my findings 
and discuss major themes amongst the effects of COVID-19 on refugees and asylum seeker 
populations in France.  I conclude by providing an overview of my project, summarizing my 
main findings, discussing limitations, and offering suggestions for further research and next steps 





Chapter 2: Refugee Resettlement and National Identity  
In response to growing migrant and refugee ‘crises’, the international refugee regime was 
created to provide ‘solutions’ to these crises, which often fall into three categories: integration, 
repatriation, and resettlement, but all three have its challenges (Long, 2014).  This report will 
focus on refugee resettlement and the important actors using available data. According to the 
UNHCR, 27 countries participated in resettling approximately 55,700 refugees in 2018 including 
the United States (17,100), Canada (7,700), the United Kingdom (5,700), France (5,100), and 
Sweden (4,900) (United Nations High Comissioner for Refugees, n.d.).  In 2020, the UNHCR 
reported that the United States resettled the largest number of refugees (6,740) followed by 
Sweden (3,543), Canada (3,496), Norway (1,504), and Germany (1,396) (United Nations High 
Comissioner for Refugees, 2021).  The following chapter will explain the importance of refugees 
in this report and how understanding the resettlement of refugees is vital in comprehending the 
entirety of this project.  Background information concerning refugee resettlement in Europe, 
specifically during the most recent migration ‘crisis’ in 2015, will be provided for context before 
focusing in on the case of France.  The second part of this chapter will focus on European and 
French national identity.   
Refugee Resettlement in Europe  
During the so-called migration crisis in 2015, more than 1 million refugees and migrants 
entered Europe.  The majority of migrants fled from their host countries of the Syrian Arab 
Republic, Afghanistan, and Iraq, of which approximately 85% crossed the Aegean Sea by boat 
from Turkey and arrived in Greece (Refugees, 2015).  Many migrants then made the journey 
from Greece to Western and Northern Europe via the Western Balkans route (ibid).  In response 
to this influx of refugees and migrants entering Europe, strict border controls and new asylum 
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system restrictions were instituted across the continent in an effort to prevent refugees from 
entering certain countries (ibid).  Germany and Sweden were the two countries that received the 
largest number of asylum applications within the EU (ibid).  In May 2015, the European 
Commission wrote the ‘European Migration Agenda’, which explained six temporary actions by 
the EU in response to the rapid arrival of refugees and asylum seekers (Carrera et al., 2015, p.3).  
Firstly, a new relocation scheme was put into place for EU member states receiving a 
disproportionately high number of asylum applications (ibid).  This temporary policy went 
against the EU’s ‘Dublin Regulation’, which stated that the first member state that a migrant 
enters is responsible for handling those asylum applications (Carrera et al., 2015, p.5).  In 
addition, a relocation scheme was established for 20,000 refugees coming from outside of the EU 
and a budget of 50 million euros for the 2015-2016 year was instituted to aid in this effort (ibid).  
The EU’s relocation scheme planned to relocate 160,000 refugees, newly arrived in Greece and 
Italy, by September 2017 (Niemann & Zaun, 2018).  The following factors were used to identify 
applicable relocation member states: the country’s population, GDP, unemployment rate, and the 
mean number of asylum applications in the previous four years (Niemann & Zaun, 2018).  
However, the relocation scheme was not fully successful because as of July 2017, only 25% of 
the 160,000 refugees were resettled (ibid).  The EU’s voluntary resettlement scheme planned to 
resettle 22,500 refugees in addition to the projected 160,000 refugees, and as of April 2017, 
15,500 displaced persons, about two-thirds of the target number, were resettled (ibid).  Thirdly, 
the EU responded by tripling its budget for the EU External Border Agency, also known as 
Frontex, which funded border control procedures in the Mediterranean, known as ‘Triton’ and 
‘Poseidon’ (Carrera et al., 2015, p.4).  Funding was increased by 60 million euros for EU 
countries receiving a large number of refugees and migrants, like Italy and Greece, and EU 
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agencies went to these ‘hot spots’ to help with the registration and identification of migrants 
(ibid).  The EU’s Europol agency instituted stronger procedures and worked with the European 
Policy College to reduce the smuggling of migrants across the Mediterranean (ibid).  Finally, the 
EU created its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), in an effort to investigate and 
terminate traffic and smuggling networks in the Mediterranean (ibid).  Ultimately, the 2015 
migration crisis shed light on the variety of attitudes and policies concerning migrant populations 
in Europe.    
Refugee Resettlement in France  
I chose to focus on the case of France for this project because of my interests and 
experience studying and living in the country, but also because it is one of the major players in 
the EU, both because it is the second largest economy and largest country geographically 
(Tardis, 2019).   
In response to the 2015 so-called migration crisis, Germany and France were against the 
reinstatement of border controls within the EU, as a French report indicated that border closures 
could cost the EU approximately 100 billion euros over ten years and threaten European 
integration (Jabko & Luhman, 2019).  Instead, Germany and France supported a quota system so 
there would be a more even distribution of migrants across EU member states (Hjelmgaard & 
Zoroya, 2015).  
The majority of refugees entering Europe wanted to settle in Germany because of the 
country’s liberal asylum laws and diaspora networks (Trines, 2017).  In response, France 
instituted a program to give 1,000 Iraqi and Syrian refugees fast-track asylum applications if they 
resettled in France.  However, the program was not extremely successful, as only 600 refugees 
came, which was likely attributed to the fear among refugees of the French people’s reception 
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had they chosen to resettle there (Petrou, 2015).  Between 2014 and 2015, France instituted a 
new refugee resettlement program to receive 500 Syrian refugees per year and between 2016 and 
2017, 3657 refugees, mostly Syrians, were admitted (Refugees, 2016).  Former French President 
François Hollande agreed to accept 24,000 migrants over two years, as part of the larger EU 
program to accept 100,000 migrants in two years (Pineau, 2015).  After the 2017 presidential 
election, French President Emmanuel Macron agreed to welcome 10,000 refugees over two years 
starting in December of that year, and by October 31, 2018, 4565 of the projected 10,000 
refugees arrived in France (Refugees, 2016).   
Resettlement and Integration  
Refugees in France face many challenges during the resettlement process.  For instance, 
the search for housing after being granted refugee status is often difficult due to language and 
socio-cultural barriers (Refugees, 2013).  It is also difficult to find work, primarily due to the 
language barrier, level or lack of education, and discrepancies in degree equivalents from other 
countries (ibid).  The following paragraphs are brief explanations of the resettlement and 
integration system in France.     
Refugees wishing to permanently settle in France must agree and sign the Reception and 
Integration Contract (CAI), which requires the completion of six hours of civic education 
training, life in France training, a skills exam, and up to 400 hours of free French language 
training if the individual’s French level is not considered sufficient (Refugees, 2013).  The 
individual’s French language level must be above the beginner A1 or A2 level of the Common 
European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) in order to qualify (ibid).  Once 
obtaining refugee status, refugees are able to receive the same benefits as French citizens and 
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foreign permanent residents, meaning they can be employed and have access to social housing, 
the French healthcare system, and other social benefits (ibid).   
Rural Resettlement   
Throughout Europe, refugee and migrant populations typically settle in urban areas.  
However, following the arrival of migrants entering Europe in 2015, there has been an upsurge 
in refugee resettlement in small towns and rural areas.  There are advantages and disadvantages 
for refugees who resettle in either urban areas or rural regions.  In urban areas, there are 
generally already established refugee communities and networks, services available for refugees, 
and a large variety of job opportunities (Tardis, 2019).  Also, far-right groups and supporters 
typically have less of a presence in urban areas compared to rural regions, which suggests that 
residents are more accepting and welcoming to refugee populations (ibid).  Conversely, in rural 
areas and small towns, there is typically a lack of services in place for refugees compared to 
urban spaces (ibid).  Due to the remoteness of these locations, refugees have reported feelings of 
isolation both emotionally and physically, as rural areas are usually a far distance from certain 
services like hospitals (Tardis, 2019).  Nevertheless, there is usually greater and more affordable 
housing in rural regions, and there is generally a need for labor (ibid).  Since the mass movement 
of migrants and refugees into Europe in 2015, a growing number of refugees have successfully 
settled in small towns and rural regions in France.     
Small towns and rural areas in France are attractive to refugees because of the 
employment opportunities, increased access and size of housing, and welcoming culture (Tardis, 
2019).  However, resettlement in these areas bring challenges as well, including finding a means 
of transportation to and from one’s place of employment.  In rural regions, one typically needs a 
car because public transportation is limited or unavailable, requiring refugees to obtain a French 
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driver’s license, which is often difficult given the language barrier, and find the funds to 
purchase a car (Refugees, 2013).   
In 2012, about half of France’s refugee population were living in the Ile de France region, 
where Paris is located (Refugees, 2013).  A French mobility program, formed in 2011, allowed 
280 migrants to move from the Ile de France region, where there is a lack of adequate housing, to 
another region with more housing availability (ibid).        
In 2015, migrant camps in Paris and Calais were dismantled and those migrants were 
temporarily accommodated in reception and orientation centers (CAOs) throughout France 
(Tardis, 2019).  Under a government program, 119 of these centers opened, mostly in small 
towns and rural regions (ibid).  This was part of a new asylum and immigrant act passed by the 
French government in 2015, similar to the 2011 mobility program, with the goal of redistributing 
migrant populations living in highly concentrated areas, like Paris and Calais, to other regions of 
France (Arfaoui, 2019).  For instance, the mayor of Uzerche, a small town in the department of 
Corrèze, with a population of just 3,000, agreed to resettle 20 refugees in 2016, mostly from 
Afghanistan, Syria, and Sudan (Hird, 2019).  By the end of 2017, there were 310 CAOs across 
France (Tardis, 2019).  In January of 2019, 60 refugees from Niger and Chad resettled in Pessat-
Villeneuve in Central France, a town with just 653 inhabitants (Schmitt & Lebas-Joly, 2019).  
Between 2018 and 2019, France required regions to find and record the number and 
location of dwellings available to house refugees, as displayed in Figure 1. (Tardis, 2019, p.40).  
The number of available dwellings was based on the region’s population, ability to receive 
refugees, the housing market, and the region’s GDP (Tardis, 2019, p.39).  Figure 2. displays the 
number of refugees resettled in the beginning of 2019, based on each region’s dwelling capacity.  
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As seen in Figure 2., the majority of refugees were settled in South-Central France, significantly 
far from the large metropolitan centers of Paris and Marseilles (Tardis, 2019, p.42).  Figure 3. 
shows the concentration, indicated by the shaded color, of first-time asylum applicants by 
department of residence in 2019.  It appears that most applicants resided in the Ile de France 
region as well as in South-Central France in the Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes department.  



















Figure 2. Number of Resettled Refugees by Département (January 30, 2019)  
 
Source: Dihal (Tardis, 2019, p.42) 
Figure 3. First-time asylum applicants (accompanied minors not included) in France by 
department of residence in 2019  
 
Source: OFPRA(Rapports d’activité | OFPRA, 2019) 
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Resettlement and COVID-19  
Refugee resettlement was suspended during France’s first COVID-19 lockdown due to 
border closures and travel restrictions.  Although France did not resettle as many refugees as 
planned in 2020, the number of resettled refugees was still higher than in 2010, 2015, and 2019 
(Table 1.).  Refugee resettlement in France was indeed impacted due to COVID-19 lockdowns 
and border closures.  Although the numbers do indicate that there was an increase in the number 
of resettled refugees in France between 2019, when 3311 refugees were resettled and in 2020, 
when 4146 refugees were resettled, this increase of less than 1,000 resettled refugees did not 
meet original resettlement goals as was to be expected (UNHCR Resettlement Data Portal).  
Very few refugees were resettled in France in 2010 compared to subsequent years.  The low 
resettlement numbers in 2010 make sense, as Europe had not yet experienced the large influx of 
migrants and refugees entering the continent in 2015.  In 2015, France resettled 1460 refugees.  
Of those resettled in 2015, the majority’s country of origin was Syria, due to the large proportion 
of Syrians fleeing their country amidst its civil war.  Syria remained the top country of origin of 
resettled refugees in France in 2020.   
The number of asylum applications in France increased each year between 2014 and 
2019.  However, only 95 600 first-time asylum applications were received in France in 2020, a 
decrease of 28% from 2019, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and temporary suspension of 
asylum applications and appointments during France’s first lockdown (Makooi, 2021).  Afghans 
were the largest group (10 100) who applied for asylum in France in 2020, followed by 
individuals from Guinea, Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, and Nigeria (Makooi, 2021).  
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Table 1. Number of Resettled Refugees in France by Country of Origin  
Country of Origin 2010 2015 2019 2020 
Afghanistan 24 7 9 16 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
48 21 28 270 
 
Eritrea 8 37 186 69 
Iran 7 9 0 5 
Iraq 18 10 1 0 
Myanmar 0 1 0 1 
Somalia  24 5 84 58 
Sudan 2 17 679 284 
Syrian Arab Republic  3 1315 1620 2909 
Other 140 38 704 534 
Total  274 1460 3311 4146 
Source: UNHCR Resettlement Data Finder  
 
Table 2. First Time Asylum Applicants (including accompanied minors) in France by Country of 
Origin  
Country of Origin 2014 2015 2018 2019 2020 
Afghanistan  472 2122 10 248 10 027 10 100 
Albania  1944 2245 8303 8032 * 
Georgia  * * 6751 7757 * 
Guinea * * 6669 6651 5800 
Bangladesh  2425 3071 3922 5810 5050 
Côte d’Ivoire * * 5282 5482 4950 
Haiti  1730 3049 2324 4708 * 
Nigeria  * * 3108 4586 3970 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
3782 2937 3964 4294  
Syria  2072 3403 4960 3745 * 
Sudan 1793 5091 * * * 
Kosovo 1594 3139 * * * 
China 2497 2815 * * * 
Iraq  606 2145 * * * 
Other  26 539 29 318 58 695 62 590 65 730 
Total  45 454 59 335 114 226 123 682 95 600 
Source: OFPRA (Rapports d’activité | OFPRA, 2015, 2019) (Makooi, 2021) 
* : unknown number 
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Future of resettlement  
The future of refugee resettlement is very much unknown at the moment, but there have 
been several thoughts on what refugee resettlement in Europe may look like as more COVID-19 
vaccines are produced and more individuals are vaccinated.  For instance, public trust may be a 
deciding factor in future resettlement plans in EU member states (Patuzzi et al., 2020).  
Resettlement in small towns and rural areas could be encouraged because there is typically more 
available housing and employment opportunities than in urban areas (ibid).  Additionally, 
resettlement in small towns and rural areas has several other benefits including a reduction in 
population ageing and population decline as well as an improved economy (ibid).  This current 
historical moment offers an opportunity to look back at refugee resettlement in Europe and 
examine changes or improvements that can be made in future resettlement operations (Fratzke, 
2020).  In December of 2019, the Global Refugee Forum set a target of 30,000 resettlement 
places for 2020 (ibid).  However, due to COVID-19 the European Commission’s Pact on 
Migration and Asylum extended the resettlement target into 2021 (ibid).  Resettlement programs 
will likely take a hit from COVID-19 because it is challenging to promote resettlement during an 
economic and public health crisis and when welfare programs are struggling to operate and 
provide necessary care and services (ibid).  COVID-19 has also brought to light government 
disinvestment in certain social programs (Patuzzi, 2020).  Community-based organizations have 
developed as a result of this disinvestment and have provided resources to promote social 
inclusion among individuals (ibid).  For instance, social innovation programs in urban areas can 
become inclusive by giving refugees and asylum seekers various opportunities in rebuilding after 
the devastating effects of COVID-19 (ibid).  It will be interesting to see how governments and 
organizations choose to move forward in a post-pandemic world and if the inequalities in 
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marginalized communities are addressed (ibid).  Technology also plays a major role in the future 
of refugee resettlement as the world has discovered how to continue to operate in social isolation 
remotely and efficiently (ibid).  For instance, France has used online learning and Massive Open 
Online Courses (MOOC’s) so they can continue to provide integration courses (ibid).  A 
resettlement official noted that they believe the resettlement process will become much more 
technology based.  For instance, instead of the French authorities and other organizations having 
interviews with refugees and asylum seekers in person, it will likely be done digitally over video 
in the future.     
 On September 23, 2020, the French parliament filed a report that urged the government to 
improve refugee and asylum seeker integration (Louarn, 2020d).  The report suggested that work 
permits and French language courses be available right after asylum applications are filed (ibid).  
The report also noted that safe and adequate housing needs to be provided for asylum seekers 
and refugees to aid in integration (ibid).   
An organizer that promotes refugee integration offered thoughts on the future of refugee 
resettlement, “Before Covid, France was more going on a path that was characterized by an 
accentuation of the externalization of asylum applications, i.e. more resettlers, more resettlement, 
less people asking for asylum with their feet in France and more people applying for asylum with 
their feet in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, etc. This movement could continue 
and/or be amplified in the future…However, it is also possible that the complete opposite 
happens: in fact, for now, the different indicators shows that resettlers are those who suffer the 
most from the Covid situation, so it may also be possible their entries are blocked”.  An NGO 
employee that works with asylum seekers and refugees in accommodation and detention centers, 
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expressed concern that we could see a rise in border restrictions and closures in France in the 
future.   
European National Identity  
Refugee resettlement schemes are often influenced by and can be a part of long instituted 
racist and xenophobic perspectives, which are founded on strong narratives surrounding ideas 
around national identity.  When investigating European identity, the questions of what is Europe 
and what is the idea of Europe come to mind.  Chalániová argues that the responses to these 
questions depend on who actually answers them, and the definition or idea of ‘Europe’ and 
‘European’ is constantly changing (Chalániová, 2013, p.7).  In other words, the idea of Europe is 
a social construct (ibid).  Henryk Broder agrees with this social construct theory in stating that 
Europe is a geographical marker, not an identity (Bunyan, 2016).  Conversely, Lichtenstein and 
Eilders define European identity as “the degree of commitment to the European group, and in 
consequence, the extent to which those who refer to the EU support or reject a sense of 
belonging and togetherness” (Lichtenstein & Eilders, 2019, p.605).  Bruter argues that the media 
plays a major part in what society considers European belonging and integration (Chalániová, 
2013).  A Greek citizen stated in an interview “The government should deport all illegal 
migrants. If there is a Europe it has to be for Europeans, not Africans and Asians. An honest man 
can’t live in Greece anymore.” (Margaronis, 2011, p.12).  This idea of the ‘other’ does not 
necessarily need to be outside of Europe, as the ‘other’ exists within Europe.  For example, 
although the United Kingdom is a part of Europe geographically, the British often separate 
themselves, referring to Europe itself as “the continent” (Chalániová, 2013, p.7).   
Although not all European countries are members of the EU, the idea of the EU is to 
represent Europe as an entity.  The EU is unique from other unions because all EU citizens have 
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the right to move freely between EU countries, known as "mobility capital" (Favell, 2014, p.282; 
Pratsinakis et al., 2020).  Twenty-six European countries are a part of the Schengen Area, 
meaning there are no internal borders, allowing the free movement of peoples across countries 
(Schengen Area - Visa Information for Schengen Countries, 2020).  For example, "Eurostars", or 
European citizens, are able to move within and receive the benefits of other European nations as 
well as experience life in their own nation-states (Pratsinakis et al., 2020, p.15).  Without these 
free movements across borders, the euro would no longer be credible (Bernhard & Leblang, 
2016).   
The eurozone crisis increased the economic gap between northern and southern European 
countries, which several scholars argue perpetuated fear and economic insecurity among 
Europeans, leading to the rise in far-right politics and nationalist rhetoric (Hudson, 2017; Bennett 
et al., 2015).  Throughout Europe, the large influx of migrants and refugees that entered the 
continent in 2015 triggered a chaotic response by the EU and non-member states.  
For instance, prior to 2015 the Nordic countries of Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark had 
the reputation of being liberal in their migration policies and were among the top countries of 
European refugee resettlement.  However, due to the rise of the far right and xenophobic 
rhetoric, the Nordic countries instituted stricter border and resettlement policies during the so-
called European ‘migration crisis’ starting in 2015.  These attitudes were not exclusive to the 
Nordic countries but were evident throughout Europe and emphasized the idea of European 
identity.   
Despite these border closures and restrictions, the ‘liberal’ versus ‘nationalist’ Europe 
debate and the rise of far-right political parties continued to thrive across Europe (Börzel & 
Risse, 2017, p.99-100).  An editorial comment in a 2015 article from the Guardian stated that 
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refugees are the “’fearful dispossessed’ who are ‘rattling Europe’s gates’” (Nail, 2016, p.162).  
Even still, refugees seeking to resettle were often labeled by the public as ‘good’ whereas asylum 
seekers were viewed as ‘bad’ (Van Selm, 2014).  
French National Identity    
Like European national identity, French national identity is at the root of xenophobic and 
racist rhetoric that exists today.  However, French national identity is not a new phenomenon and 
some scholars suggest it is inherently tied to colonialism (Haddad & Balz, 2006).  This argument 
is based on the idea that xenophobia began in the era of the French Empire under the mission 
civilicatrice, or civilizing mission ideology (ibid).  The mission civilicatrice was the thinking that 
French culture was superior and should be exalted onto peoples whose cultures are considered as 
lower (ibid).  France’s strong Republican model that favors the assimilation of refugees and 
migrants into French society and culture has persisted and individuals in France are expected to 
be “French” regardless of their ancestry or background (Alba & Foner, 2015).  For instance, 
France upholds the separation of church and state, known as “laïcité”, the core of the French 
Republican model which was evident in the ban prohibiting the wearing of Islamic headscarves 
in public spaces and burka ban (Beaman, 2016, p.44).  The concepts of “laïcité” and “métissage” 
(meaning “melting pot” or “mixed/ethnic population”) play an important role not just in terms of 
narratives surrounding French national identity, xenophobia, and racism, but how these 
narratives exist in contemporary French culture.  Further investigation is necessary as I only 
briefly touch on this complex and significant topic.        
   The question of what constitutes French identity was assessed by Patrick Simon in his 
2008-2009 survey entitled “Trajectories and Origins: Survey on Population Density in France” 
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(Simon, 2012).  The findings from 22,000 participants indicated that one’s ethnicity did not 
necessarily determine the extent of one’s French national identity (ibid).  More than 90 percent 
of those participants who had a strong identity with their ethnicity also felt “at home in France” 
(Simon, 2012, p.15).  However, even if immigrants feel they belong in the nation, their identity is 
hindered because the nation of France itself does not recognize immigrants as belonging to the 
nation (ibid).  Individual identity is often a difficult question for second generation immigrants 
because they feel they are forced to choose between their national identity and their parents’ 
national identity (Alba & Foner, 2015).  A survey conducted in France revealed that two-thirds 
of children with immigrant parents felt they had two identities, one to France and one to their 
country of origin (ibid).  Second generation immigrants have also reported that while they may 
feel French, their “Frenchness” may not be validated by others (ibid).  Also, ethnic groups are 
not recognized in France, which increases barriers faced by immigrants (ibid).  For instance, 
immigrants are extremely underrepresented in France’s political job sector but that is beginning 
to change as immigrants are increasingly holding political positions and now French political 
parties are putting greater emphasis on promoting diversity (ibid).  The sociologist Dominique 
Schnapper coined the term “downward assimilation” to describe the challenges immigrants from 
northern and sub-Saharan Africa face after entering France like the limited employment 
opportunities and the resulting low social status (Ther, 2019).  These difficulties for immigrants 
make what the French consider assimilation nearly impossible, hence the term “downward 
assimilation”.   
Ideology based on French national identity is often reflected in far-right political parties 
that use xenophobic and racist rhetoric to reassert their ideas.  Joel Fetzer analyzed the rise of 
far-right political groups and the Front National in France through a theory of mass nativism, 
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which is essentially prioritizing one’s self-interest of a nation’s peoples over peoples of other 
countries (Schmitt & Lebas-Joly, 2019).  Fetzer conducted a survey among French voters that 
assessed attitudes towards immigration under Le Pen’s far-right Front National party.  The 
results found that on a scale from 0 to 4 reflecting anti-immigration attitudes, the average score 
among participants was 1.7 (ibid).  The lowest average score was among France’s managerial 
and professional class, which indicates that participants belonging to that group were the least 
opposed to immigration (ibid).  When measuring support for Le Pen’s Front National on a scale 
from 0 to 29, the average was 3.5 (ibid).  Although, the average was very skewed as 40% of the 
participants were among France’s professional class, who were generally in favor of immigration 
(ibid).  In the first round of France’s 2002 presidential elections, Le Pen was the second highest 
voter percentage at 17% (“Toxic but Containable,” 2002).  Although he never was elected 
president, his role and legacy in French politics should not be unnoticed.     
 The rise of the far-right continued in 2007, when Nicolas Sarkozy was elected as the 
President of France.  Shortly after coming into power, Sarkozy created the Ministry of 
Immigration, whose goal was to foster French national identity and connect that identity to 
immigration (Ocak, 2016).  Sarkozy wanted the power to choose which immigrants entered the 
country, referred to as “immigration choisie” (Ocak, 2016, p.85).  Under this policy, Sarkozy 
would determine who the “right” and “wrong” immigrants were and only allow the “good” 
immigrants to enter France (ibid).  The reasoning behind Sarkozy’s thinking was France’s 
supposed identity crisis (ibid).  Benedict Anderson argues that “identification with an imagined 
community and the We/Other distinction is at the core of national identification” (Ocak, 2016, 
p.92).  Sarkozy believed that the individuals he considered having a “French” identity were the 
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only people permitted to be in France and all other peoples who did not identify as French were 
viewed as a “threat” to the nation of France.   
France’s Front National and other far-right populist political parties gained additional 
support after the November 13, 2015 Paris terrorist attacks.  The leader of France’s Front 
National, Marine Le Pen, called for increased border control and closures following the Paris 
attacks and in the December 2015 regional elections, the share of the Front National’s electorate 
soared to 28 percent (Francis & O’Grady, 2015; Wollin, 2017).  Islamophobia was also more 
prevalent after the terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016 as was evident in the book Une France 
Soumise, Les Voix du Refus, which argues that the growing population of Islam in France is a 
threat to French culture and identity and is leading to the emergence of France as a “foreign 
land” (Lindsey, 2017, p.2).  
 
Evidence shows that xenophobic attitudes are concentrated in different environments and 
among various populations.  Allport’s contact theory argues that increased contact with 
immigrants decreases xenophobic rhetoric (Jolly & DiGiusto, 2014).  On the other hand, threat 
theory argues that conflict is more likely among populations where various groups interact 
because they are competing for resources (ibid).  Using data from the 2002 French Electoral 
Panel, 1999 French National Census, and Eurostat Region database, it was reported that in 
France, there is less xenophobia in areas with larger populations of immigrants compared to 
areas with smaller immigrant populations (ibid).  Lamont and Duvoux propose that in the context 
of France, the fear of immigrants is rooted in the aging population and the rise of unemployment 
(Lamont & Duvoux, 2014).   
 French xenophobic attitudes are even reflected in the media.  For example, the portrayal 
of immigrants, specifically the children of North African immigrants, was analyzed by three 
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French newspapers: Le Figaro, Le Monde, and L’Humanité (Clare & Abdelhady, 2016).  They 
describe how the notion of immigrants and the “other” is persistently viewed as a threat in 
regards to culture, the economy, and employment (Clare & Abdelhady, 2016, p.15).  Le Figaro is 
a very conservative newspaper that “rejects the possibility of multiculturalism” while Le Monde 
and L’Humanité see immigrants as victims of discrimination (Clare & Abdelhady, 2016, p.26).  
Up until the opening of the Cité Nationale pour l’Histoire de l’Immigration, a French 
immigration museum in Paris, immigrants have not been remembered by the nation (Blévis & 
Pezet, 2012).  Although immigration has been a part of French history since the 19th century, the 
immigrant is still viewed as invisible and temporary by much of the French population (ibid).  
Xenophobia is often connected to racism and other systems of oppression.  For instance, 
sociologist Michèle Lamont argues that French racism is not based on race, but is based on one’s 
culture (Beaman, 2012).  An example of this were the 2005 riots in the banlieues of France 
which were precipitated by the Maghrébin (term used by the French for Muslim North-Africans) 
immigrant youth in response to the death of two immigrant youths who were killed when being 
chased by police (ibid).  The riots addressed issues of police harassment, unemployment, and 
discrimination faced by the youth Maghrébin population (ibid).  Second generation Maghrébins 
are only “partially assimilated” in French culture because they are never considered to be fully 
French (Beaman, 2012, p.50).  It seems that in these accounts, second generation Maghrébins are 
perceived as belonging to a different culture based on their race.     
Following the 2005 riots by the immigrant youth in the banlieues, Sarkozy viewed the 
immigrant as an “Islamist polygamist, living off the state, whose children were left loafing on the 
streets” (Boubeker, 2013, p.191).  Sarkozy was not the only individual who felt this way as many 
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French citizens blame social and economic problems on North African immigrants (Lamont & 
Duvoux, 2014).      
Beaman discusses various accounts of second generation North African individuals living 
in France including Safia, who is a 32-year-old with both Tunisian and French citizenship 
(Beaman, 2012).  She explains how she faces discrimination because she is not “white French” 
even though she was born in France (ibid).  Safia believes that although she identifies as French, 
she will never be considered French by society’s standards because of the color of her skin 
(ibid).  Ahmed, a Muslim of Algerian origin who lives in France, faces discrimination because of 
his appearance and how he is perceived by others (ibid).     
Beaman conducted interviews with Muslim North-African (Maghrébin) individuals living 
in the Paris region in 2008 and 2009 (Beaman, 2016).  Based on the interviews, she found that 
Muslim North-Africans identified with French Republican society while still remaining 
connected to their Maghrébin culture (ibid).  However, a social movement among French 
Muslims in an effort to combat the negative stereotypes and treatment of Muslims in France is 
unrealistic because of the differing views between French Muslims (Beaman, 2016).  For 
instance, some French Muslims support national policies such as the ban of the hijab and burqa, 
despite those policies being a consequence of French right-wing nationalist ideology (ibid).    
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Chapter 3: Global Pandemics and the Case of COVID-19  
 
Now that I have provided a brief summary of refugee resettlement and national identity 
across Europe and in France specifically, I will provide some background information regarding 
COVID-19 and other past pandemics in order to contextualize its effects on refugee and asylum 
seeker populations.  The literature in this section will focus on the subtopics of borders, public 
health, enforcement, and stigmatization/discrimination.    
Because literature concerning COVID-19 is very new and emergent, my project will 
draw information from two main sources. For primary data I will look mainly at governmental 
and NGO statistics on cases and outcomes, while for context I will be reviewing secondary 
research related to past pandemics, such as the 1918 influenza, 2003 SARS outbreaks, and 2009 
H1N1 influenza, and their effects among asylum seeker and refugee populations. I will also be 
examining reports on the subjects of borders, public health, enforcement, and discrimination 
targeting asylum seeker and refugee populations during previous pandemics and during COVID-
19 in France. 
Borders 
In 2020 European countries enabled border restrictions due to the COVID-19 global 
pandemic.  On March 17th, 2020, amidst border closures and travel restrictions, the UNHCR and 
IMO temporarily stopped all resettlement departures, meaning that all individuals and families 
who were about to be resettled had nowhere to go (Resettlement and COVID-19 | European 
Resettlement Network, 2020).  In the past, governments reacted to the spread of a pandemic by 
closing their country’s borders in hopes of reducing the spread of the disease. However, based on 
evidence from previous pandemics, like the Spanish influenza, infectious diseases extend beyond 
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borders and populations (Kraut, 2010). Past pandemics have also revealed that the movement of 
peoples, including those seeking asylum or refuge, increases transmission, especially in today’s 
globalizing world (Snowden, 2019 & Carter, 2016). This has also been the case with COVID-19, 
as Ylva Johansson, European Commissioner for Home Affairs stated in an interview that closing 
borders will not stop the transmission of the virus and she was proven to be correct as the virus 
spread across the world (Nicholson, 2020)  
Various countries used COVID-19 to justify their security measures and isolationist 
ideology.  Perzyna argues that Western nations have excluded asylum seekers in their response 
to COVID-19 and that the closure of borders in these countries defies international law in 
regards to the sharing of responsibilities among countries (Perzyna, 2020).  Furthermore, 
scholars and health experts argue that border closures are not a necessary public health measure 
during epidemics such as COVID-19 but is instead used to justify exclusionary policies such as 
the disregard of asylum seekers and refugees in health care responses, but when any community 
is left out of the public health care response, these actions do not combat the spread but in fact 
exacerbates transmission (Lau et al., 2020).  Thus, asylum seekers are in an extremely 
challenging situation because they are unable to enter any country other than the country they are 
fleeing, due to COVID-19.  As Persyna (2020) states, “asylum seekers are often construed as 
security risks, potential terrorists, as well as economic threats”, which is why the global North is 
exclusionary (p.3). Furthermore, closing borders exacerbates illegal border crossings, which only 
increases virus transmission (Ventura, 2016).  Ventura (2016) also argues that the closure of 
borders to asylum seekers does not comply with the International Health Regulation’s (IHR) 
proportionality test because in a world of debate between essential and non-essential travel, when 
individuals are forced to flee their homes due to life-threatening circumstances, whether it be 
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persecution, war, or violence, those individuals have the right to seek safety regardless of 
COVID-19 security measures. 
Due to the COVID-19 global pandemic and economic recession, which paves the way for 
heightened xenophobia, we must work together in assisting asylum seekers and refugees during 
this unpredictable time (Persyna 2020).  However, border restrictions and closures in response to 
COVID-19 actually go against the international non-refoulement policy which states refugees 
should not be forced to return to the country that they were originally fleeing (Persyna, 2020).  
Several scholars argue that the heightened security and border closures as a result of COVID-19 
are being implemented not for the health and safety of all individuals but to purposely exclude 
asylum seekers and refugees from their rights, programs, and opportunities that formerly existed 
in these nations (Persyna, 2020).   
The EU pledged to resettle 29,500 refugees by the end of 2020, but that will now be 
extended into 2021 due to these unprecedented measures (ibid).   
Public Health 
Since the start of COVID-19, scholars, journalists, and activists wrote about the 
pandemic’s disproportionate effect on minority populations, specifically refugees.  For instance, 
Somali communities in Norway, Sweden, and Finland were disproportionately infected with 
COVID-19 (Masri, 2020).  Refugees were largely left out of the global and national response to 
COVID-19.  Dempster et al. stressed the importance that all populations be addressed and 
acknowledged in the COVID-19 response because the actions of one group impacted all other 
populations (Dempster et al., 2020).  Two of the major obstacles for refugees during COVID-19 
were income and health.  In fact, many refugees were forced to choose between making an 
income, which involved putting one self’s health at risk, or prioritizing one’s health and choosing 
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not to work, which left one with no income (ibid).  Conditions were especially different for 
refugees living in camps compared to urban areas during COVID-19.  In urban areas, there are 
typically more economic opportunities than refugee camps, but they lacked the extent of 
resources available in camps (ibid).  However, during COVID-19, most refugees both in camps 
and in urban spaces did not work.  Unfortunately, monetary aid programs did not usually take 
into account refugee populations (ibid).  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarian, 
and other aid groups had to severely reduce or even stop their services in order to protect their 
employees’ health and comply with social distancing restrictions and government regulations 
(Dempster et al., 2020).  
The World Health Organization (WHO) calls for the inclusion of refugees and migrants 
in public health care plans in all countries.  WHO believes health care is a human right and that 
everyone should have equal and fair access to health services regardless of one’s financial 
situation (World Health Organization, 2020).  Should certain populations, like refugees and 
asylum seekers, be excluded from these necessary services it puts everyone else at risk because 
all populations need to be addressed in order to ultimately combat COVID-19 (ibid).  WHO also 
argues that vulnerable populations have been disproportionately affected by COVID-19 and calls 
for an inclusive public health response to COVID-19 that adheres to international human rights 
regulations in order to recognize these inequities, improve and expand health systems, and work 
towards eliminating discrimination and stigmatization of vulnerable populations like refugees 
and asylum seekers (ibid).  A recent survey conducted by WHO, entitled Apart Together, found 
that of the survey respondents, the majority of refugees and migrants did not seek medical care if 
they thought they had COVID-19 (ibid).  Of those respondents, 35% indicated that they did not 
seek medical care because of financial reasons and 22% reported they did not do so because of 
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fear of deportation (ibid).  Approximately 20% of respondents reported that it was difficult to not 
utilize public transportation and comply with stay-at-home orders during the COVID-19 
pandemic (ibid).  The study also revealed that refugee and asylum seeker populations with secure 
accommodation got their information concerning COVID-19 through the news, social media, 
and friends and family (ibid).  On the other hand, houseless individuals and refugees and asylum 
seekers living in accommodation centers or camps were not typically provided with these same 
sources of information regarding COVID-19 (ibid).  Because of this lack of information among 
vulnerable populations, the WHO study reported that NGOs and other organizations are vital in 
relaying COVID-19 information to refugees and asylum seekers who do not have access to 
informative sources (ibid).  The Apart Together survey also revealed that refugees and asylum 
seekers living on the street, in accommodation centers, or in camps have an increased risk of 
mental health problems due to COVID-19 (ibid).    
According to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, asylum seekers, migrant workers, and undocumented 
immigrants are only granted “life-saving” and “emergency” medical care (Wickramage, 2018). 
Undocumented persons are even more at risk of contracting and transmitting diseases because of 
the fear of both receiving care and potential deportation (Truman et al., 2009).  In encampments 
inhabited by refugees, the state in which these camps are located are responsible for ensuring the 
human rights of refugees including shelter, food, water, proper sanitation, and healthcare but 
how these processes are implemented varies across camps (Bakewell, 2014).  It is essential that 
migrants and other displaced populations be addressed in public health responses and the 
vulnerabilities due to this identity be adequately addressed (Ager, 2014).   
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Enforcement  
The Apart Together survey respondents reported that COVID-19 government restrictions 
significantly affected their lives especially among refugees and migrants (World Health 
Organization, 2020).  Refugees and asylum seekers living on the streets, in centers, or camps 
reported that their daily lives were worse than those living in secure accommodation based on 
the following categories: housing, work, safety, food, clothes, financial means, NGO support, 
medical care, and health (see Figure 4.). 
Figure 4. Relationship Between Basic Life Necessities/Characteristics and Housing Situation of 
Participants during COVID-19  
 
Source: Apart Together Survey (World Health Organization, 2020, p.22) 
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Stigmatization/Discrimination    
Instances of xenophobia and discrimination towards refugees and other minority 
populations increased in Europe and across the globe, arguably because COVID-19 was both a 
public health and economic crisis (Dempster et al., 2020).  Discrimination and xenophobia 
during epidemics have always been a common theme.  For instance, the bubonic plague led to 
the blaming and subsequent murder of various European communities including Catalans in 
Sicily (Bavel et al., 2020).  Haitians were thought to be responsible for the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS in the US and African migrants were blamed for the spread of Ebola (Ventura, 2016). 
Anti-Chinese discrimination was also prevalent during the SARS outbreak in 2003 and has 
continued during the COVID-19 pandemic (Jones, 2020).  When immigrant populations are 
stigmatized as being carriers of disease, even though public health officials argue that the health 
of immigrants is typically better than the country’s native-born population, it is referred to as the 
“migrant health paradox” (Carter, 2016). During the SARS outbreak, individuals who looked 
Asian or were of Asian origin were often discriminated against based solely on their appearance 
(Person et al., 2004). Fear and stigmatization of specific ethnic groups have often been 
associated with disease outbreaks, like when Irish immigrants were thought to be carriers of 
cholera in the 1830s, or when tuberculosis was referred to as the “Jewish disease” (Kraut, 2010).  
Rhetoric used to describe illnesses and epidemics such as “targets”, “enemy”, and “fighting” 
suggest that these illnesses are life-threatening, which perpetuates fear among the public (Logie 
& Turan, 2020).  The COVID-19 pandemic was blamed on foreigners, largely peoples of Asian 
origin, as the virus originated from China, but also migrant and refugee populations (ibid).  In 
economic crises, people generally care about their situation, not others, which perpetuates the 
xenophobia and discrimination we have seen and continue to see today (ibid).  The ‘us’, meaning 
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host country populations, versus ‘them’, meaning refugee and migrant populations, paradigm 
was especially present during the time of the virus, as many governments closed their borders in 
an effort to stop ‘them’ from supposedly transmitting the virus to ‘us’ (Foresti, 2020).  For 
example, there were instances among groups and political parties in France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, and the UK, who used COVID-19 to propagate xenophobia and the fear of the ‘other’ 
(ibid).  There is a clear stigma, primarily in “developed” countries that refugees and migrants 
carry the virus with them, which only increases instances of xenophobia and discrimination.  
COVID has heightened already existing xenophobia and racism and has led to countries not 
adhering to international human rights law which permits individuals to move freely and permits 
individuals in need of protection to enter spaces (World Health Organization, 2020). 
Approximately 40% of respondents who did not have secure accommodation in the Apart 
Together survey reported that they experienced discrimination and unemployed refugees and 
asylum seekers said that they experienced increased discrimination compared to those who 
continued to work (ibid).  Figure 5. shows the distribution of survey respondents who reported 
that they experienced worse discrimination than before the COVID-19 pandemic, experienced 
similar levels of discrimination compared to prior to COVID-19, and respondents who 
experienced less discrimination during the COVID-19 pandemic than before (ibid).  Of the 
respondents that reported worsening discrimination during and because of COVID-19, younger 
individuals (between 20 and 29 years old) reported the highest levels of worsening 
discrimination (see Figure 6) (ibid).  Figure 6 also displays the heightened levels of 
discrimination using three categories: unfair police treatment, name calling due to 




Figure 5. Level of Discrimination According to Participants due to COVID-19  
 











Figure 6. Scale of Increased Discrimination According to Participants due to COVID-19 Based 
on Age  
 
Source: Apart Together Survey (World Health Organization, 2020, p.19). 
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Chapter 4: Findings  
While the effects of COVID-19 on refugees and asylum seekers varied across countries, 
this study will focus on the case of refugee and asylum seeker populations in France.  Some of 
this research was conducted through electronic interviews with volunteers and employees of 
NGOs and aid groups who work with or assist asylum seekers and refugee populations.  Other 
data is drawn from policy reports, popular press, and organization documents.  The following 
paragraph gives a general timeline of France’s COVID-19 lockdown and travel restrictions. 
In an effort to reduce the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the French government issued a 
shutdown of all non-essential businesses and public gatherings on March 14th, 2020 (The French 
Government Response to the COVID-19, 2020).  Three days later, on March 17th, the French 
government instituted a country-wide lockdown that lasted until May 11, 2020, after which 
restrictions were slowly lifted (Wojazer & Kent, 2020; Magnenou & Matalon, 2020).  During 
this first lockdown, borders, schools, non-essential shops, restaurants, and cafés were closed 
(Centre for Civil and Political Rights, 2020).  Individuals were told to only leave their place of 
residence when absolutely necessary, in which case they were required to carry a document, or 
attestation proving why they were not at their place of residence (Wojazer & Kent, 2020).  
Individuals not following these orders faced a fine of up to 135 euros (ibid).  It was during this 
first lockdown that asylum cases and procedures in France were put on hold (Timberlake, 2020).  
On October 30, 2020, France entered its second COVID-19 lockdown but schools and factories 
were permitted to open (“Coronavirus,” 2020).  During France’s second lockdown, asylum 
procedures resumed.  On November 28, 2020, France began to ease these lockdown restrictions 
and nonessential businesses were able to open (Chen, 2020).  Beginning on January 16, 2021, a 
national curfew was instituted from 6PM-6AM (Connexion journalist, 2021).  A travel ban 
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began on January 31, 2021, that prohibited travel to non-EU countries as well as individuals 
traveling from non-EU countries wishing to enter France (ibid.).  On March 31st, 2021, President 
Emmanuel Macron announced that France will be entering a third national lockdown, but this 
was after I finished collecting my data and conducting my research (Onishi & Méheut, 2021). 
My main research question asks how COVID-19 has affected asylum seeker and refugee 
populations in France.  I will focus on the topics of borders, public health, enforcement, and 
stigmatization/discrimination as I seek to answer this question.  The following provides 
information related to my research question and is based primarily on qualitative data from 
interviews, policy reports, NGOs and aid groups, and popular press articles.     
Borders 
During France’s first COVID-19 lockdown, borders were closed along with many 
airports in order to reduce unnecessary travel.  An NGO volunteer stated that arrivals did 
decrease during France’s lockdowns due to border closures and restricted transportation, 
especially trains.   
Border closures and increased border security made it nearly impossible for asylum 
seekers and refugees to enter France through Italy.  As of July 2020, the volunteer group Caritas 
Intermelia in Ventimiglia, Italy reported that French authorities were turning back around 100 
migrants a day at the Italy-France border (ANSA, 2020).  However, these actions by the French 
police were illegal because asylum requests were not addressed (Oberti, 2020b).  A refugee 
official explained how asylum seekers from Italy were supposed to be relocated to France in 
February 2020 but this movement was cancelled.  They said “French accommodation centers in 
charge of welcoming asylum seekers were not really comfortable with having people relocated 
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from Italy” despite them coming from Southern Italy, not Northern Italy where the majority of 
COVID-19 cases were reported at the time.  They also mentioned a report by OECD that stated 
less than half of the number of migrants entered France in 2020 than in 2019.   
An organizer that promotes refugee integration stated that during France’s first lockdown, 
their organization was permitted to continue working because it was deemed as essential by the 
French government.  These operations were of course modified because of COVID-19 health and 
safety concerns.  There was more flexibility with operations during France’s second lockdown as 
the interviewee stated that “As a matter of fact, we rather did 50% face-to-face and 50% working 
from home, whereas during the first lockdown we were approximatively at an average of 95% 
working from home and 5% face-to-face, or maybe 10%”.  This same organization suspended 
the housing of refugees between March and August of 2020 but was able to resume its housing 
operations in September 2020.   
Another popular route for migrants is from France across the English Channel to the UK.  
Both France and the UK increased security efforts to stop migration across the English channel 
due to COVID-19 security measures, which resulted in twice the number of police at France’s 
northern beaches (Wallis, 2020).  These security measures also included increased surveillance 
and technologies, the ending of smuggling networks, increased port security, and 
accommodation for migrants in France (ibid).  The ultimate goal for French rescue authorities is 
to save lives, so when encountering migrant boats in the English Channel heading to the UK, 
they typically stop their journey (Boitiaux, 2020).  Therefore, because these boats and rafts are 
typically unsafe and overcrowded, migrants are often brought back to France by authorities 
(ibid.).  As of October 2020, French authorities had collected 1,317 migrants trying to cross the 
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channel to the UK (InfoMigrants, 2020).  Despite these efforts two adults and two children died 
after a boat capsized off coast of Dunkirk and 15 were injured in October of 2020 (Deutsche 
Welle, 2020b).   
In response to terrorist attacks in France and Austria, French President Emmanuel 
Macron announced in November 2020 that France would double the number of border guards 
and urged the EU to increase security across the Schengen Zone and EU borders (Deutsche 
Welle, 2020c).  Macron stated “We see very clearly that terrorist actions can actually be led by 
some people who use migratory flows to threaten our territory…So we must reinforce our 
controls for reasons of national security” (ibid).  These security measures were in addition to 
COVID-19 border closures and restrictions.     
Public Health  
 
Following COVID-19 border closures and travel restrictions on March 17, 2020, refugees 
and asylum seekers faced an ever-growing threat: contracting COVID-19.  Refugees and asylum 
seekers living in unstable accommodations, whether that be on the streets, in camps, or in 
accommodation centers, were and continue to be at a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 
compared to the general public due to highly populated living quarters, unsanitary conditions, 
and inadequate government support and health services. Aid groups significantly reduced or 
stopped their operations all together due to COVID-19 restrictions in an effort to protect the 
health of their employees and volunteers.  Unfortunately, the temporary closures of these aid 
groups left migrants in a precarious situation because aid was largely needed.  The International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) created a document for refugees and asylum seekers, available 
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in 39 languages, which provides COVID-19 information about what the actual virus is, 
symptoms, at-risk conditions and populations, and preventative measures (Butler, 2020).   
After France’s first lockdown was put in place, 732 migrants living in camps in 
Aubervilliers, a suburb of Paris, were evacuated to hotels and sports arenas, in the hopes of 
reducing COVID-19 transmission (Massih, 2020).  However, there were hundreds more migrants 
in these camps that were not moved, leaving them stranded on the streets with nowhere to live 
(ibid).  Also, because asylum applications and appointments were temporarily suspended during 
this period, there was a rise in refugee and asylum seeker populations without secure 
accommodation, which increased the demand and number of individuals in camps and 
accommodation centers.   Although, according to an NGO employee, asylum seekers who were 
already accommodated in reception centers at this time, even if their claims were rejected, 
continued to live in the reception centers in an effort to limit the number of individuals without 
accommodations.  The interviewee explained how the government tried to accommodate as 
many houseless individuals as possible, not just refugees and asylum seekers.   Similar situations 
were seen at migrant camps in Calais and Dunkirk, where some migrants were brought to centers 
that reached capacity quickly, so many were left in crowded and unsanitary conditions, where 
social distancing was essentially impossible (Louis, 2020).  In Calais, migrants and refugees 
were stranded outdoors in tents (Butler, 2020).  Due to COVID-19 and Europe’s eventual 
reopening of borders, the number of migrants in Calais nearly doubled from 2019 into 2020 
(Louarn, 2020c). 
In Saint-Denis, a camp was dismantled with 2500 migrants for public health reasons but 
were accommodated and tested for COVID-19 (Bras, 2020).  Due to high positivity rates, 
migrants were provided with necessary health care at an accommodation hotel, where social 
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distancing and other health and safety protocols were enforced (ibid).  According to an NGO 
employee, approximately 2,000 migrants were evacuated from a camp, but many were 
accommodated.  However, around 500 migrants were not accommodated and had no choice but 
to continue living on the street until they were forced to move again.   
Asylum seekers living in France were especially vulnerable to contracting COVID-19 
because they are not permitted to access government medical assistance if in France for less than 
three months (Stangler, 2020).  If they became ill, they had to go to the emergency room, which 
was not only dangerous but essentially impossible during COVID-19 as hospitals were not well 
equipped or prepared for the sudden influx of patients (ibid).  
After France’s first COVID-19 lockdown and during the second lockdown, asylum 
seeker operations and hearings were able to resume again, but not to the extent as prior to the 
pandemic (Dumont, 2020b).  Due to COVID-19 health and safety concerns, children were asked 
to not be brought to these appointments or hearings.  Individuals with appointments had their 
temperatures checked upon arrival and the wearing of face masks was required (ibid).  Facial 
masks were provided if the individual did not have one (ibid).   
Even still, there were and continue to be concerns that migrants will not be provided with 
the necessary accommodation for the health of themselves and others.  After France’s first 
lockdown restrictions were lifted, the number of migrants in Paris without accommodation 
nearly doubled largely due to unemployment and not having the means to pay for housing 
(Louarn, 2020b).  Although, France’s winter safe period, which requires the government to 
provide accommodation to vulnerable populations during the cold months, aided some 
individuals (Louarn, 2020a).  Also, airport terminals that were previously open during the 
evening closed during the lockdown and individuals who were sleeping there had nowhere to go, 
 47 
which put their health as well as the public’s health in danger as masks were not readily available 
(ibid).    
During France’s second lockdown, migrants at a camp in Saint-Denis did not have 
adequate food, lived in unsanitary conditions, and were fearful of contracting COVID-19 
(Carretero, 2020).  Aid groups called for authorities to provide adequate shelter for the migrants, 
preferably hotels instead of other accommodations as those locations were hubs for COVID-19 
transmission (Carretero, 2020).  Médécins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) conducted 
800 COVID-19 tests of migrants in November of 2020 across various accommodation centers in 
the Paris region (France Evicts Hundreds of Migrants amid Covid-19 Fears, 2020).  One in two 
migrants tested positive for COVID-19 in ten different centers, which MSF attributed to severe 
overcrowding (ibid).   
Young migrants, who are considered minors up until the age of 18, are important to 
consider in terms of housing and public health.  The Mission MNA (Mineur Non 
Accompagné/Unaccompanied minor) provides unaccompanied young migrants with housing, 
food, schooling, health care, and a small sum of money each month.  However, if a young 
migrant is not recognized as a minor by the MNA, they do not receive these services but may be 
accommodated in homeless relief housing.  I interviewed an individual who volunteers for an 
organization that assists unaccompanied minors in France.  Currently, the organization that this 
interviewee volunteers with is housing 45 young migrants with the help of 150 families.  When 
COVID-19 entered France, the organization had to reduce the number of transfers between 
families in an effort to prevent COVID-19 transmission, especially because host families are 
often elderly.  The organization housed 43 youth with host families during France’s first 
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lockdown and only two youth did not feel comfortable living with families but were able to be 
individually accommodated.  Although, there was not a sufficient amount of housing that was 
adapted to meet COVID-19 health and safety requirements, so some young migrants were 
accommodated in hotels.  These conditions were not ideal as the young migrants were not able to 
leave their rooms during lockdown and received pre-prepared meals.            
Enforcement  
On September 23, 2020, French police evicted approximately 500 people, mostly 
Afghani, from a camp at Place de la République in Central Paris.  Police used teargas, shock 
grenades, and truncheons towards migrants, journalists, and protestors.  The camp was again 
dismantled in November 2020 (Deutsche Welle, 2020e).  The actions of French police have been 
denounced by human rights groups and government officials including the mayor of Paris, Anne 
Hidalgo.  Meanwhile, a controversial bill was proposed that would give police the authority to 
film and surveil public spaces but also essentially prohibit the public from identifying police and 
soldiers should it harm their physical or mental state (ECRE, 2020).   
In September of 2020, about 300 migrants lived at a makeshift camp under a highway 
bridge in Saint-Denis where early every morning the police came and told them to ‘get out’ 
(Dumont, 2020a).  In November 2020 French authorities dismantled a migrant camp in Saint 
Denis that housed around 2,000 asylum seekers (Deutsche Welle, 2020d).  Authorities claimed 
the dismantlement was due to COVID-19 safety concerns, but migrants were forced onto buses 
and there were reports of tear gas (Deutsche Welle, 2020d).  On December 2nd, 2020 authorities 
in Calais deforested areas where migrants were camping before attempting to cross the English 
Channel.  "Deforestation is clearly aimed at deterring exiles from settling down," said François 
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Guennoc from Auberge des Migrants. "My country is at war and look how we are being 
welcomed. We are beaten, gassed and now we are being hunted in the woods,” commented a 40-
year old Sudanese, adding “Trees protect us from rain, wind and cold, for lack of a better option” 
(ECRE Weekly Bulletin 11/12/2020, 2020).  Conversely, an organization volunteer said that 
during France’s lockdowns, authorities “were rather kind”.  
A resettlement official explained how France’s Ministry of Interior had a director who 
oversees the integration and reception of refugees.  During both of France’s lockdowns, 
individuals were required to carry a document each time they left their residence, called an 
attestation, explaining why they were not at their place of residence.  The form was translated in 
multiple languages, but the resettlement official said “actually only the French version was 
authorized by authorities”.  This posed a problem for individuals, especially refugees and asylum 
seekers, who were not able to complete the form correctly if they did not read or write in French.  
The form was also available online, but for individuals who did not have a cellphone, internet 
access, or were not able to fill out the form correctly because they did not understand French, it 
was particularly challenging.    
An organizer who promotes refugee integration stated that lockdown enforcement was no 
different for refugees compared to other individuals.  They explained that “Accompanied 
refugees’ feedbacks suggest that they have rather well experienced the period of COVID and 
lockdowns because they have felt, rather oddly but at the same time it is understandable, that 
they were like anyone else”.  In fact, they “observed a behavior on the part of refugees that was 
quite exemplary regarding the situation we were experiencing, and it seems that because of what 
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they already had experienced, they actually had already been under lockdowns many times. In 
view of all that they have experienced, they have better lived this lockdown than we have”.  
Stigmatization/Discrimination  
When the migrant camp at Place de République was dismantled, there were indeed 
various reports, photos, and videos posted on social media of police brutality including beatings 
and the use of tear gas.  As a resettlement official stated, there was “a lot of confrontation” 
between migrants and police.  This resulted in a dialogue between individuals who believe there 
are too many migrants in France, while on the other hand, individuals who are fighting for the 
rights of migrants.  Professor François Gémenne stated that authorities “constantly try to push 
migrants out of our cities, out of our borders, out of our fields of vision, with the obvious aim of 
making them invisible to the rest of us” (Dumont, 2020d).  Gémenne argues that the underlying 
problem enacting this xenophobic rhetoric is the question of accommodation and lack of 
accommodation (ibid).  An organization volunteer agreed with Gémenne in stating that 
“COVID-19 brings a period of instability in France (with for example a strong rise in the number 
of asylum seekers for humanitarian groups).  The need for social aid has increased.  I think that 
unfortunately this only encourages far-right ideology…And the question of accommodation will 
once again be essential”.   
All of the individuals I interviewed did not see or think there was necessarily an increase 
in xenophobic or racist rhetoric since the arrival of COVID-19 in France but did in fact recognize 
that racism and xenophobia is still a very real problem in much of the country.  A refugee official 
said that “those people who are racist are still racist…and they’re very afraid of the foreigners 
bringing COVID and other disease or bringing poverty to France”.  An organizer who promotes 
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refugee integration did not think there was an increase in xenophobic or racist rhetoric but did 
say that there have been a few incidents of aggression from asylum seekers or refugees in 
France, that have been heavily mediatized.  They said that when questions regarding social 
acceptance arose in their neighborhoods, refugees may have made connections and said, “but I 
am not a terrorist”. However, this has been an extreme minority and globally everything is going 
well”.      
Police violence, specifically targeting asylum seekers and refugees, is largely based upon 
“a logic (that) criminalizes irregular migration as if it were a serious crime” (ibid).  The 
criminalization of migration is also evident in France’s “police intuition” policy, which allows 
police to evaluate if a person is permitted to illegally migrate to France (Dumont, 2020d).  This 
process is discriminatory because it gives police the power to judge if a migrant is a “risk” based 
on their preexisting biases concerning gender, nationality, religion, sexuality, race, and a variety 
of other characteristics (ibid).    
Police not only exert violence on asylum seekers and refugees, but also upon other 
marginalized populations.  For instance, the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis sparked 
protests against police brutality and violence across France.  One protester said “In France, we 
say we are all equal, but we are not all treated equally.  If you’re a young black or an Arab man, 
you’re targeted and harassed by the police…We’re not making this up, but white people don’t 
want to hear us or believe us.  They think we’re exaggerating” (Deutsche Welle, 2020a).  
Another protestor discussed their concern for the safety of their brother, who has been racially 
profiled by police and stopped several times (ibid).  Racial justice protests were also in response 
to the death of Adama Traoré, who was 24 years old in 2016 when she died in police custody 
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(ibid).  Two autopsies reported two different causes of death, one being that Traoré died of 
previous health conditions and heart failure while the other attributed Traoré’s death to police 
force during her arrest (ibid).  In October 2020, 22-year-old Ibrahima Bah was killed in a motor 
crash in the Paris suburbs when supposedly escaping a police check and Bah’s family blames 
police (French Protesters March to Denounce Racism, Support Undocumented Migrants, 2020).  
Moreover, young Arab and Black men are reported to be twenty times more likely to be stopped 
by police and other authorities than white individuals, which proves that racism within the police 
system is a real problem in France (Deutsche Welle, 2020a).   
 Racism is also evident when looking at the disproportionate number of African 
immigrants in France who died of COVID-19.  According to INSEE, a statistic agency run by 
the French government, death rates among African immigrants in France doubled, and rates 
tripled in the Paris region during the peak of France’s COVID-19 outbreak (Press, 2020).  North 
of Paris, in the suburb of Seine-Saint-Denis, death rates increased by 95% among those born in 
France but increased by 191% among individuals born in North Africa, and 368% among those 
born in sub-Saharan Africa (ibid).     
There is also the issue of many unaccompanied young people in France not being 
identified by the government as minors (Oberti, 2020a).  It is a long and extraneous appeal 
process to be declared a minor in France and NGOs are oftentimes the only resource available 
for these young individuals.  Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) and Utopia 56 
are some of these organizations that aid unaccompanied minors but unfortunately these resources 
are not enough for the more than 300 unaccompanied foreign minors in just the Île-de-France 
region (ibid).  Along with other aid organizations, Utopia 56 set up a camp strategically placed to 
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draw attention to Paris authorities in an effort to address this injustice (ibid).  Utopia 56 
advocates that the same services be provided to unaccompanied foreign minors as asylum 
seekers (ibid).  Were these services provided to unaccompanied foreign minors, it would 
essentially mean that they would be provided with adequate housing as well as educational, 
social, and health care services, until the unaccompanied minors are officially granted minor 
status (ibid).  On September 24, 2020, a bill was passed by France’s National Assembly 
concerning the confinement of minors (Louarn, 2020e).  The National Council for Human Rights 
(CNDH) wanted the number of confined minors and the length of confinement to significantly 
decrease if not end (ibid).     
For migrants and refugees who reside in France, the renewal of residence permits has 
been an extremely challenging process for individuals amidst COVID-19 lockdowns and 
precautions (Makooi, 2020).  Appointments for residence permit renewals have been difficult to 
schedule and the virtual application technology has not worked properly (ibid).  For instance, a 
Beninese caregiver living in France was told to leave the country during COVID-19 because she 
was not apparently integrated enough and supposedly did not submit her residence permit 
renewal in time (Dumont, 2020c).  Activists argue that this residence permit renewal is 
discriminatory towards migrants and resettled refugees and violates human rights regulations 
(Makooi, 2020).   
A refugee official noted that there was definitely some fear and mistrust among 
individuals working with asylum seekers and refugees or just the public sector in general during 
COVID-19.  For instance, within their organization, there were a lot of questions and concerns 
regarding the testing of migrants for COVID-19 before entering France.  Refugees had to be 
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tested for COVID-19 but French Nationals residing abroad did not.  As they explained, “we had 
to be even more convincing and prove that we were implementing things to avoid having 
COVID-19 widespread by refugees or asylum seekers”.  Perhaps that explains why Frichti and 
Stuart, both delivery companies, fired all undocumented workers in France due to COVID-19 
(France, 2020b; Carretero, 2020b). 
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Chapter 5: Analysis  
 
Findings Summary 
The following paragraphs provide a brief summary of my main findings as a means to 
transition to my analysis of major themes.   
Firstly, France’s COVID-19 related closures and lockdowns prevented refugee 
resettlement and asylum procedures from operating for a period of time.  This left refugees and 
asylum seekers in a very challenging position because they likely had no secure accommodation, 
putting their health and safety severely at risk during a global pandemic.  Refugee and asylum 
seekers are already vulnerable populations, and that vulnerability is compounded when living in 
unsecure accommodation due to overcrowded and unsanitary conditions, which creates a highly 
contagious environment that is ideal for the transmission of COVID-19.  If these refugee and 
asylum seeker populations are accommodated by the French government or aid groups in centers 
and hotels, instead of occupying camps or living in the street, they are still at an increased risk of 
contracting COVID-19 simply because of the close living quarters and constant contact with 
individuals.  It is important to remember that when the health of a population, in this case 
refugees and asylum seekers, is put at risk, the public’s health is put at risk as well, so it is vital 
that all populations be addressed when responding to public health emergencies.       
In addition, many temporary camps where refugees and asylum seekers were living 
during COVID-19 were dismantled by the French police in order to supposedly protect the 
public’s health.  During these camp dismantlements, there were several reports of police force 
and violence targeting asylum seekers and refugees taking place.  Although, there was significant 
pushback by these populations and aid organizations advocating for the rights and fair treatment 
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of asylum seekers and refugees.  It is important to note that these instances of police brutality and 
discrimination are not a result of COVID-19 but are rooted in France’s history of xenophobia 
and racism and are inherently tied to questions surrounding French national identity.   
Themes  
 Based on the data I collected in response to my research questions, I found several 
themes concerning the effects on refugees and asylum seeker populations during COVID-19.  I 
will use the information I collected in my literature review as a critical lens in analyzing my 
research findings in order to assess the impacts COVID-19 imposed on asylum seeker and 
refugee populations in France.  I argue that France’s history with refugee resettlement, national 
identity, xenophobia, and racism have produced a vulnerability among refugee and asylum 
seeker populations, and these unjust systems have been perpetuated and brought to light in the 
age of COVID-19 and are evident in the restrictive mobility, accommodation, and fear and 
mistrust of refugee and asylum seeker populations.   
Restrictive Mobility 
Many countries closed their borders in an effort to reduce COVID-19 transmission and 
contain the virus, but these measures essentially stopped resettlement moves and the processing 
of asylum seeker applications in France for a period of time.  The theme of restrictive mobility 
makes sense because when borders are closed or restricted and operations are halted, refugees 
and asylum seekers attempting to enter a country, in this case France, are not able to physically 
do so.  It is important to note that the admission of refugees and asylum seekers into France was 
also halted when the country’s national security was thought to be under threat, as was done in 
November 2020 after terrorist attacks in Austria and France.   
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One could argue that the closure and heightened security at France’s borders was a 
mechanism to keep immigrants and “non-French” individuals out of the country, which stems 
back to xenophobia and French national identity. When refugees were trying to enter France 
during these lockdown periods, authorities were not accepting asylum claims, which clearly 
violated international human right law stating that all asylum claims must be addressed.  
Although France’s borders were closed at the time and the processing of asylum applications was 
temporarily suspended, authorities were still obliged to acknowledge migrants that wished to 
seek asylum.  Similarly, asylum seekers and refugees were oftentimes not addressed by the 
French government even though COVID-19 and its subsequent security procedures were very 
much unprecedented.  Meanwhile, due to attestation requirements during France’s COVID-19 
lockdowns, refugees and asylum seekers were especially vulnerable to camp dismantlements by 
French authorities, even though they were prohibited from moving to different areas under 
lockdown procedures.  This left refugees and asylum seekers in a very precarious situation 
because the French government and aid organizations were offering very limited 
accommodation, so many individuals had nowhere to go.  Furthermore, when individuals in 
France were mandated to stay at home except for life essential reasons, refugees and asylum 
seekers living in camps and on the streets were not able to do so because they had no home.  It 
was extremely challenging and even impossible for refugees and asylum seekers to obtain a new 
copy of an attestation every time they left their residence.  Also, because of the language barrier, 
it was even more difficult to actually understand what the attestation said and there was the 
added challenge of filling out the form correctly.  These circumstances not only put the health of 
refugees and asylum seekers in danger, but also the health of the general public because of the 
highly contagious nature of COVID-19.   
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Accommodation 
Services from NGOs and aid organizations were in high demand during the height of 
COVID-19, but due to travel restrictions and concerns for the health of employees and 
volunteers, as well as the general public, resulted in the lessoning of aid operations that were 
urgently needed for refugees and asylum seekers.  Consequently, NGOs and aid groups were not 
able to accommodate the housing demand of refugees and asylum seekers given their supply of 
workers and resources, which left even more individuals living on the streets.  Even if refugees 
and asylum seekers were accommodated, it was most often in centers where social distancing 
was impossible, increasing COVID-19 transmission among an already vulnerable population.       
Healthcare needs to be provided fairly to all individuals, which includes refugee and 
asylum seeker populations, in order to protect the health of the public.  Based upon the evidence 
I collected, it is clear that refugee and asylum seeker populations have been put in an even more 
vulnerable position than prior to COVID-19 especially in regard to their health, so all 
populations must be addressed fairly and justly in a public healthcare response. 
As the literature and data indicate, refugee and asylum seeker populations are at a higher 
risk of contracting COVID-19 for various reasons, the majority related to accommodation.  
Individuals that have unsecure housing do not have the privilege of staying at home in a secure 
and safe space but are often living in crowded and unsanitary conditions where COVID-19 
transmission thrives.       
The requirement of all individuals to carry an attestation during COVID-19 lockdowns 
and the dismantlement of migrant camps by police are both reflective of the inability of many 
refugees and asylum seekers to find a place to live on the street, if they were not housed in 
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centers or by the French government or move to a new place.  Essentially, refugees and asylum 
seekers have been punished for inhabiting certain “public” spaces and forcibly displaced from 
those spaces.       
As the WHO Apart Together survey indicates, refugees and asylum seekers with 
unsecure accommodation during COVID-19 across countries experienced negative effects in 
their daily lives in some way due to their housing situation.  This worsening of living conditions 
caused by COVID-19 poses a direct threat to public health, which was very evident in refugee 
and migrant camps in France.  Furthermore, the question of accommodation during COVID-19 is 
essential in protecting not only the health of marginalized communities, like refugees and asylum 
seekers, but also the health of the general public.  Accommodation is already difficult to find for 
refugees wishing to resettle in France, so one can imagine the extensive challenges during a 
global pandemic.   
Fear/Mistrust 
A common theme throughout my research was the mistrust and fear of refugee and 
asylum seeker populations during COVID-19.  There was often a fear among some of the public 
that migrants would bring or had brought COVID-19 to France.  This fear and mistrust are 
unfounded and is reflective of dialogue in previous global pandemics where individuals felt that 
certain people or populations were to blame for the health crisis and resulting chaos even if this 
logic has no scientific basis.  Although, this rhetoric persists and is ultimately rooted in 
xenophobia and French national identity that prioritizes what society deems as “French” 
individuals, which is based on the criteria of being white and native-born French and excludes 
individuals that do not fit this model.  When certain individuals feel their French identity is being 
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threatened, it can result in the purposeful removement of “non-French” populations from the 
public sphere or at least the public eye.  This was evident when migrant camps were dismantled, 
and incidents of police brutality were reported.  Police brutality is inherently tied with race and 
targets non-white individuals, including many refugees and asylum seekers as well as North 
African immigrants.  Also, even if my research does not explicitly cite instances of targeted 
attestation checks by police, I have a hard time believing these checks did not take place given 
France’s history with racist and xenophobic rhetoric and discourse surrounding French national 
identity.  Race is also a significant factor when looking at COVID-19 deaths in France as there 
were a disproportionate high number of COVID-19 deaths among North African immigrants 
compared to the native French population.  This also demonstrates the structural racism within 
the health care system that values the lives of white individuals over individuals of color.   
Based on the interview responses I received, although the fear and mistrust of refugee 
and asylum seeker populations has existed in the past and continues to exist, there has not been a 
significant increase during COVID-19.  However, this is only according to a small number of 
individuals and is from an outsider’s perspective.  I would argue that the fear and mistrust of 
marginalized groups like refugees and asylum seekers has increased during COVID-19 because 
of evidence from previous global pandemics where these ideas were very much circulating but 
also evident through mechanisms like border closures and instances of police brutality that were 
labeled as necessary to protect France’s public health but are actually founded in histories and 





 When analyzing my findings, it is helpful to look at whether and how they either confirm 
or disprove what I discussed in the literature review.  For instance, it is clear that much of 
Europe, including France, has and continues to use border closures as a means to prevent 
refugees and asylum seekers from entering a country during ‘crises’ or large increases in 
migration like the 2015 migration influx in Europe and the COVID-19 global pandemic.  I argue, 
and my findings support this, that this isolationist approach is imbedded in European national 
identity more broadly, and French national identity in the case of France.  As the literature 
review discussed, xenophobic and racist rhetoric stems from ideas surrounding national identity 
that is exemplified by excluding the ‘other’ or what are believed to be individuals, most often 
from marginalized populations, that do not meet what this ideology deems as truly “European” 
or “French”.  There is a fear of a loss of national identity at play here if for instance refugees and 
asylum seekers are permitted to enter a country.   
 Contrary to this exclusive and arguably discriminatory narrative, and despite resettlement 
restrictions, current data indicates that the resettlement numbers in France actually increased 
between 2019 and 2020 (see Table 1.).  However, due to the temporary suspension of asylum 
procedures during France’s first COVID-19 lockdown, the number of asylum applications 
significantly decreased between 2019 and 2020 (see Table 2.).  On the other hand, the number of 
resettled refugees in France increased between 2015 and 2019, but only by less than 2,000 
individuals over those four years which was likely due to both the large influx of migrants 
entering Europe in 2015 and circulating xenophobia (see Table 1.).  Also, the number of asylum 
applications in France increased between 2014 and 2015 (see Table 2.).  These patterns suggest 
that national identity and xenophobic rhetoric still have power.  Whiles these ideas may not 
 62 
always be clear or manifested in the public eye, there continues to be dialogue surrounding the 
fear and mistrust of the ‘other’ or “non-French”, whether that be refugees, asylum seekers, or 
North African immigrants.   
 The use of force on refugees, asylum seekers, and other individuals that are not deemed 
as truly “French” by French police is an example of the resistance to these marginalized 
populations both prior, during, and after their entry into France.  As stated before, these 
processes are rooted in discrimination and fear of the ‘other’, and are justified as national 
security concerns, especially after the 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks in France, or as necessary 
for the nation’s public health during COVID-19.  I believe that fear of the ‘other’, fear of 
refugees and immigrants, and fear within French politic institutions has a significant in shaping 
French culture and society and needs to be investigated further were I to continue this project.   
It is important to note that xenophobic and racist rhetoric is not used or believed by every 
individual in France, and there is much resistance to these ideas, like in the protests against 
police brutality and the treatment of migrants during camp dismantlements.  Even still, ideas 
surrounding national identity, xenophobia, racism, and other acts of discrimination are very 
much a reality not only in France, but across the world.  Moreover, the majority of these findings 
confirm my main argument that refugees and asylum seekers are already vulnerable populations 
and COVID-19 has brought these structural inequalities to light that are rooted in narratives of 





Chapter 6: Conclusion  
 
Project Overview  
This thesis project investigated the ways in which refugee and asylum seeker populations 
have been affected by the COVID-19 virus in France.  My research stemmed from a variety of 
sources, consisting of some of my own research I conducted and based upon previous research 
that provides some historical context.  First, I gathered information about the situation of 
refugees and asylum seekers in previous pandemics to offer some insight before looking at the 
case of COVID-19.  I then pulled information from the database I compiled this past summer 
through my funded research project in collaboration with Dr. Bose which looked at the situation 
of refugees and asylum seekers across Europe in the past decade.  In addition to the database I 
built upon, I interviewed several employees and volunteers at organizations in France that work 
with refugee and asylum seekers to add a more personal perspective to my research.  After 
compiling my data from both the database, interviews, and other COVID-19 specific literature, I 
critically examined and coded this information and then conducted an analysis that I categorized 
by theme.   
Much has changed concerning COVID-19 since when I concluded my data collection.  
COVID-19 cases continue to rise in France and other European countries are experiencing a 
surge as well, including Italy, which was the original COVID-19 hot spot in Europe.  However, 
vaccinations are becoming more widely available and more individuals are being vaccinated.  On 
March 31st, 2021, President Emmanuel Macron announced that France will be entering its third 
COVID-19 national lockdown (Onishi & Méheut, 2021).  This lockdown will not be as strict as 
previous lockdowns as individuals will not be required to carry an attestation when they leave 
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their place of residence (ibid).  However, individuals must remain within a six-mile radius of 
their place of residence, are not permitted to travel across regions, and must adhere to a 7PM-
6AM curfew (ibid).  Schools will also be temporarily closed for at least three weeks (ibid).  On 
the same day of Macron’s announcement the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center 
reported that France had a total of 4,646,014 confirmed COVID-19 cases and 95,495 reported 
deaths (France - COVID-19 Overview - Johns Hopkins, 2021).  Only 4.04% of France’s 
population has been fully vaccinated (ibid).  It is vital that France has a just and equitable 
vaccination plan that prioritizes the most vulnerable populations, including refugees and asylum 
seekers.  Further research must be conducted looking at the effects on refugee and asylum seeker 
populations under France’s third national lockdown.        
Findings 
There were three main themes that presented themselves in my research: restrictive 
mobility, accommodation, and fear and mistrust.  My research found that refugees and asylum 
seekers in France were severely restricted in their movements, both physically and socially, due 
to COVID-19 related restrictions and lockdowns.  Also, refugees and asylum seekers in unsecure 
accommodation or living on the streets were at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 and 
France’s public health response was not adequate in protecting the health and wellbeing of these 
vulnerable populations.  Lastly, refugees and asylum seekers, although not always directly, 
experienced the consequences of France’s fear and mistrust of migrants, which is founded in a 
long history of xenophobia and racism in France.       
I believe that this project successfully answers my general research question asking how 
asylum seeker and refugee populations in France have been affected by COVID-19.  There will 
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always be more research to be done for this project given the constant information produced by 
various outlets and the transforming situation of COVID-19, but for the time being, I would say 
that this project provides an adequate amount of information to answer that question.  Also, I 
believe that my research supports my argument that COVID-19 exacerbated the vulnerability of 
refugee and asylum seeker populations and this is evident in my findings about restrictive 
mobility, accommodation, and fear and mistrust.  
This research is important because it combats popular narratives that dehumanize 
refugees and asylum seekers, and marginalized populations in general, especially in times of 
‘disaster’ or ‘crises’, like COVID-19.  Refugees and asylum seekers are disregarded and are 
often viewed as a statistic or ‘other’.  However, it is essential that compassion and understanding 
take reign over the dehumanizing and xenophobic rhetoric that exists.  It is helpful and important 
to consider what one would do if they were in a refugee or asylum seeker’s life-threatening 
situation.  Refugees and asylum seekers are people too and it is our duty to ensure that all 
individuals are granted the same basic human rights in the fight for a more just world.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This project provided me the opportunity to learn about the field of research and the role 
that research plays in the discipline of the social sciences.  Although the COVID-19 global 
pandemic was helpful in an odd way in paving my ideas for this project, it still had its challenges 
especially in trying to retrieve and navigate through information and data in a time of great 
uncertainty.  For instance, I had to purposely stop seeking out information, despite the constant 
and emerging research being reported every day, because it was unsustainable, and I needed to 
focus on my analysis.  It was also challenging to find individuals willing to be interviewed and 
 66 
who also had the time and resources to do so during an extremely busy time for many 
organizations and aid groups due to COVID-19.  The circumstances were not ideal, but I am very 
grateful to have had the opportunity to discuss the situation for refugees and asylum seekers in 
France with individuals working, directly or indirectly, with refugee and asylum seeker 
populations.   
I think that the categorization of refugees and asylum seekers in France, in combination 
with the French state’s refusal to recognize ethnicity and race, is problematic and reaffirms 
homogeneities that are not actually present.  If I were to continue this project, it would be 
necessary to reevaluate and reframe these categorizations in Table 1. and Table 2.  For instance, 
it may be valuable to redraw these tables by specifying the motivations for which individuals left 
their country of origin, like for environmental or political reasons, instead of funneling 
individuals into the broad categories of refugees and asylum seekers.  I would need to conduct 
further research in order to properly push back against France’s assumptions and stereotypes of 
refugee and asylum seeker populations.   
I also wish to turn my attention to why certain policies and restrictions were put in place 
in France for refugee and asylum seeker populations during COVID-19 instead of focusing more 
on how these populations were affected by COVID-19 as I did in this project. 
If I had more time and resources to pursue this project, I would continue compiling 
information concerning COVID-19.  In addition, I would interview more individuals in France to 
gain further insight into the experiences of refugees and asylum seekers during COVID-19.  
Also, I would have ideally been able to stay in France to continue my studies and research for 
this project, but the severity of COVID-19 did not allow for that.  Eventually, in the years ahead 
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after COVID-19 data is compiled and published, one could analyze the impacts that COVID-19 
had on refugee and asylum seeker populations and even compare these findings to previous 
events that significantly affected these populations.      
COVID-19 offers an opportunity to examine and think about the underlying structures 
and processes that cause refugees and asylum seekers to leave their country of residence and 
second to actually be successful in leaving that country.  There are additional challenges along 
the way including entering and being received in a new country and then the challenges faced in 
that country if they are given the opportunity to reside there.  Furthermore, it is vital to add 
historical context not only to this project but to the processes that impact refugees and asylum 
seekers more broadly.  Although governments, NGOs, and other aid organizations are working to 
aid these populations and make these transitions less burdensome, there still needs to be a more 
compassionate and human rights-based approach to the treatment and reception of refugee and 
asylum seeker populations.   
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